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Abstract
The theoretical study of social learning typically assumes that each agent’s
action affects only her own payoff. In this paper, I present a model in which agents’
actions directly affect the payoffs of other agents. On a discrete time line, there
is a community containing a random number of agents in each period. Before
each agent needs to take an action, the community receives a private signal about
the underlying state of the world and may observe some past actions in previous
communities. An agent’s payoff is higher if her action matches the state or if
more agents take the same action as hers. I analyze two observation structures:
exogenous observation and costly strategic observation. In both cases, coordination
motives enhance social learning in the sense that agents take the correct action with
significantly higher probability when the community size is greater than a threshold.
In particular, this probability reaches one (asymptotic learning) with unbounded
private beliefs and can be arbitrarily close to one with bounded private beliefs. I
then discuss the issue of multiple equilibria and use risk dominance as a criterion
for equilibrium selection. I find that in the selected equilibria, the community size
has no effect on learning under exogenous observation, facilitates learning under
endogenous observation and unbounded private beliefs, and either helps or hinders
learning under endogenous observation and bounded private beliefs.
Keywords: Information aggregation, Social earning, Coordination, Herding,
Information cascade, Information acquisition
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1 Introduction
The study of social learning focuses on how valuable information is transmitted in a
society of self-interested and strategic agents as well as how dispersed and decentralized
information is aggregated to facilitate greater precision of knowledge. A typical situation
involves a large number of individuals who make a single decision sequentially. The
payoff of this decision depends on an unknown state of the world, about which each
individual is given a noisy signal. The state of the world may refer to different economic
variables in different applications, such as the quality of a new product, the return on
an investment opportunity, or the intrinsic value of a research project. The probabilistic
distribution of signals depends on the state and is assumed to be distinctive for each
possible value of this state. Hence, if signals were observable, the aggregation of signals
would be sufficient for individuals to ultimately learn the value of the state with near
certainty. However, because signals are private and often cannot be transmitted via
direct communication, an individual must extract information from observations of her
predecessors’ decisions to determine her own actions. A general and important question
thus arises: what behaviors and observation structures can lead to the level of learning
achieved by efficient information aggregation? In other words, under what conditions will
observation reveal the true state, and how likely is it that agents will make the correct
decision?
The above framework has been adopted widely in the literature, including but not
exclusive to the notable study of herding behavior and information cascades in various
applications, such as investments[32], bank runs[17] and technology adoption[13]. Among
the literature that provides a theoretical analysis, renowned early research by Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer and Welch[7], Banerjee[5] and Smith and Sorensen[33] demonstrates that
efficient information aggregation may fail: in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, individuals
eventually herd in choosing the wrong action with positive probability. Recent works
such as Acemoglu et al.[1] consider a more general observation structure and note that
society’s learning of the true state depends on two factors: the possibility of arbitrarily
strong private signals and the nonexistence of excessively influential individuals.
However, despite the large body of theoretical literature on social learning and in-
formation externalities, most models fail to account for a crucial factor that influences
individual strategic behaviors: coordination motives. In an environment with coordina-
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tion motives, one agent’s action may directly affect another agent’s payoff. The absence of
this effect greatly limits the range of applications that can be analyzed using the standard
framework because coordination motives are prevalent in many strategic environments
that involve social learning, ranging from the choice of computer software to the choice
of research areas. In addition, the very existence of coordination motives often facili-
tates local information sharing in both signaling and observations because individuals
in such situations have mutual interests in such sharing. Hence, one should expect to
see very different patterns of action as well as information updating in the observational
learning process. Finally, most existing studies assume that observation is given by some
exogenous stochastic process, but in many applications, it is part of an agent’s strategic
decision. Presumably, once observation becomes a choice, it should have an immediate
effect on the accuracy of action and should also change how coordination motives in-
fluence social learning. Therefore, a more general framework is needed to include these
important elements in the study of social learning and to fully understand their impact.
To focus on the typical strategic environment with the above features, consider the
following example. There is a group of consumers who need to decide which one of two
possible smartphones to switch to in their usage. The sequence of actions is determined
by the expiration dates of their current contract. Among this group, there are smaller
“communities” of consumers (for example, college friends who enroll in the same wireless
phone package) that make their decisions within a relatively small period of time. For a
consumer in an arbitrary community, because interaction is more convenient among peo-
ple using the same model, she prefers that others use the model that she chooses. Before
she makes her own decision, she may observe some previously made decisions from other
communities. Such observations may be exogenously given: they may simply come from
noticing which smartphones other people in her social network are using. Alternatively,
observations may be strategically chosen: the consumer can pay a registration fee to en-
ter an online forum where she can see other consumers’ choices with corresponding time
stamps. If she is not able to view all the available posts, her rational choice is to select
the most informative posts. Finally, regardless of the observation structure, she will most
likely share her observations with others in her community but not with outsiders.
In this paper, I propose a model that is consistent with the framework of Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer and Welch[7] and Acemoglu et al.[1] and is simultaneously flexible to
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analyze coordination motives under different observation structures. More formally, there
is an underlying state of the world that is binary in value and cannot be observed directly.
On an infinite and discrete time line, there is a community of random size in each period,
and its members (the agents) each take a binary action simultaneously. The payoff of
an agent depends on whether her action matches the state as well as what actions are
taken by others in her community. The more agents take the same action as she does, the
higher the payoff she enjoys. At the beginning of the period, the agents in the community
obtain a noisy signal about the true state1. The value of this signal is common knowledge
within the community but cannot be observed by any other community.
After obtaining the signal but before taking the action, the agents simultaneously
observe a subset of actions of their predecessors, i.e., agents from previous communities.
The observed actions are locally shared information as well: in other words, actions ob-
served by one agent are also observed by every other agent within the same community.
Observation is exogenous if it is pre-determined, regardless of the signal and the com-
munity size. Observation is endogenous if each agent can choose to pay a fixed cost and
select a given number of ordered actions to observe.
Hence, there are three central determinants of the pattern of social learning: signal
strength (bounded or unbounded beliefs), observation structure (exogenous or endoge-
nous) and strength of coordination motives (community size). This paper establishes
the first theoretical framework to understand the interaction among these factors and to
answer the question of when observation is truth-revealing and whether asymptotic learn-
ing occurs in this more realistic but complex environment. In particular, I highlight the
contrast between the pattern of learning in a singleton community and that in a poten-
tially large community. As can be expected, coordination motives in a large community
bring about an additional “desire to conform” that is absent when each agent cares only
about her own action. However, as suggested by my major findings summarized below,
the incentive to decide based on the group is not entirely negative. On the contrary,
coordination motives may improve learning in each combination of signal structure and
observation structure.
1The assumption of one signal for each community is used without loss of generality in the case of
local sharing. Equivalently, we could assume that each agent has one signal that she shares only with
others in her community.
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First, suppose that observation is exogenous. When beliefs are unbounded, meaning
that a private signal may be arbitrarily informative about the true state, agents can
almost surely know the state from their observed action sequence if they always observe
an action that has been taken recently. Moreover, because observation is independent
from signal value, the stronger notion asymptotic learning can be achieved: not only do
agents know the true state with near certainty, but their actions converge to the “correct”
action as well. This result holds regardless of the community size and is consistent with
existing results in the theoretical literature.
When beliefs are bounded, coordination motives facilitate better learning. Previous
research has shown that when there is only one agent in each period (i.e., when the
community size is one), observation never reveals the truth over time. However, I show
that when the community size becomes sufficiently large, there exists an equilibrium with
truth-telling observation. In such an equilibrium, an agent may take either of the two
actions for any possible posterior belief that she has on the true state: given a certain
range of a signal, she takes her action according to the signal and otherwise acts according
to the observation. A rough intuition for this result is that when the community size is
sufficiently large, if all but one agent in a community choose one action, it would be
optimal for the remaining agent to choose the same action even if it is unlikely to be the
“correct” action. Hence, even under bounded beliefs, it is possible for all agents to base
their actions on their signal for a non-zero measure of signals, regardless of when they each
move in the action sequence. The signal effectively serves as a correlation device, which
ensures efficient information aggregation from observing the actions of predecessors. As a
further result, depending on the construction of equilibrium strategies, the probability of
taking the correct action can become arbitrarily close to 1 at the limit; hence, asymptotic
learning can be approximated under strong coordination motives even if the most precise
signal has only limited information value. Indeed, as long as the probability of agents
acting only according to the signal is positive, observation reveals the truth at the limit.
Hence, decreasing this probability in turn increases the probability of taking the correct
action.
Now suppose that observation is endogenous. An initial observation is that even
under unbounded private beliefs, asymptotic learning is not achievable: the probability
of taking the correct action is always bounded away from 1. The reason is that with costly
5
observation, an agent is not willing to observe whenever her signal is sufficiently precise
but still not perfect. I then give a sufficient and necessary condition for truth-telling
observation: the size of an agent’s observed neighborhood becomes arbitrarily large over
time. Because of the impossibility of asymptotic learning, any observation of finitely
many actions has erroneous implication on the true state with positive probability; this
probability of error can be eliminated once infinitely many actions are observed.
In the presence of coordination motives, the equilibrium learning patterns change sig-
nificantly. When the community size is potentially large, an equilibrium emerges with
asymptotic learning (with unbounded beliefs) or approximate asymptotic learning (with
bounded beliefs). Such improvement in learning is driven by the possibility of incentiviz-
ing observation in a large community. For example, imagine a community in which all but
one agent choose not to observe any action. For the remaining agent, her observation is
very valuable to both her peers and herself because when agents care about the actions of
other agents, even a small improvement in learning about the true state brings a consid-
erable increase in all of their payoffs. Moreover, additional incentives for observation can
be provided by the credible threat of conforming to a sub-optimal action in the absence of
observation. Following this intuition, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which at
least one agent always chooses to observe for any value of the private signal. Therefore,
the argument under exogenous observation can be applied to establish or approximate
asymptotic learning. This implies that the negative incentive for observation, as induced
by observation cost, can be eliminated by the marginal benefit of observation under co-
ordination motives. At the same time, efficient information aggregation still exists as
a result of either unbounded beliefs or a small but positive probability of coordinated
actions based on signal only.
One prominent difference arising from the inclusion of coordination motives in the
model is that multiple equilibria arise in general, in contrast to the generically unique
equilibrium with singleton communities. In the discussion section, I address the issue of
equilibrium selection by imposing the criterion of risk dominance. I show that the equilib-
rium in which each agent always maximizes the probability of action matching the state
is risk dominant, and I reveal that in this equilibrium, stronger coordination motives still
lead to better learning. Under bounded beliefs, however, the risk-dominant equilibrium
has different implications: depending on the observation structure, the equilibrium learn-
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ing probability with coordination motives may be higher, lower or unchanged relative to
that with singleton agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Sections 4 and 5 respectively present
the main results under exogenous observation and endogenous observation. Section 6
discusses some additional features and extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes the
paper. All proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
A large and growing body of literature examines the problem of social learning by
Bayesian agents who can observe others’ choices. This literature begins with Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer and Welch[7] and Banerjee[5], who first formalize the problem systemat-
ically and concisely and identify information cascades as the cause of herding behavior.
In their models, the informativeness of the observed action history outweighs that of
any private signal with a positive probability, and herding occurs as a result. Smith and
Sorensen[33] propose a comprehensive model of a similar environment with a more general
signal structure. They show that signal strength plays a decisive role in social learning
in the sense that the possibility of arbitrarily strong signals is necessary and sufficient for
asymptotic learning in their framework. The concepts of bounded and unbounded private
beliefs introduced by those authors will play an important role in the remainder of the
current paper. These seminal papers, along with the general discussion by Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch[8], assume that agents can observe the entire previous decision his-
tory, i.e., the whole ordered set of choices of their predecessors. This assumption can be
regarded as an extreme case of exogenous observation structure. Related contributions to
the literature include Lee[29], Banerjee[6] and Celen and Kariv[12], where agents observe
only a given fraction of the entire decision history.
A more recent paper by Acemoglu et al.[1] studies the environment in which each
agent receives a private signal about the underlying state of the world and observes (some
of) their predecessors’ actions according to a general stochastic process of observation.
Their main result states that when the private signal structure features unbounded belief,
asymptotic learning occurs in each equilibrium if and only if the observation structure
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enables agents to always observe some close predecessor. Other recent research in this
area include the works of Banerjee and Fudenberg[4], Gale and Kariv[22], Callander
and Horner[10] and Smith and Sorensen[34], which differ from Acemoglu et al.[1] mainly
in making alternative assumptions regarding observation, e.g., agents observe only the
number of other agents taking each available action but not the positions of the observed
agents in the decision sequence.
Two common assumptions made in the abovementioned literature are exogenous ob-
servation and pure informational externalities; according to the latter, an agent cares
only about taking the correct action, and her payoff is not directly affected by others’
actions. The literature exploring the relaxation of either of these assumptions is relatively
under-developed. A few recent papers initiated the discussion on the impact of costly
observations on social learning. In Kultti and Miettinen[27][28], both the underlying
state and the private signal are binary, and an agent pays a cost for each action that she
observes. In Celen[11], the signal structure is similar to the general one adopted in this
paper, but it is assumed that an agent can pay a cost to observe the entire history of
actions before hers. A much richer model is given by Song[35], as it allows for the most
general signal structure as well as the possibility that agents would need to strategically
choose a proper subset of their predecessors’ actions to observe. A major implication
from these works is that the existence of observation costs prevents asymptotic learn-
ing, although it may increase the informativeness of an observed action sequence because
agents will sometimes rationally choose not to observe and rely on their signal.
The theoretical literature on the interplay between information cascades and coordina-
tion motives is also rather small. Moreover, the few existing papers often differ from one
another in important aspects, such as the payoff function, the sequence of moves and the
information update process (see, e.g., Choi[13], Dasgupta[15], Jeitschko and Taylor[26],
Frisell[21], Vergari[36]). However, there is also a small group of experimental studies of
information cascades and payoff externalities (see, e.g., Hung and Plott[24], Drehmann et
al.[18]). The major results of those studies suggest a learning pattern that is consistent
with this paper: when agents care about the actions of one another beyond the infor-
mational externalities, they are both more likely to conform and more likely to take the
“correct” action. Informational herding is thus reduced.
This paper can be positioned in line with the works of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
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Welch[7], Smith and Sorensen[33], Acemoglu et al.[1] and others in the sense that I adopt
the general signal structure and the sequential decision process developed in these models.
Nevertheless, this paper differs from the previous research in two important aspects. First,
instead of assuming an exogenous observation structure, I allow observation to occur as
part of an agent’s strategic decision. Second, in addition to informational externalities, my
model also features payoff externalities: the more agents take the same action, the higher
the payoff each agent enjoys. As shown subsequently in this paper, these assumptions
not only are more realistic in most applications but also have significant impacts on the
equilibrium learning pattern.
In this paper and in most of the cited theoretical papers above, agents are assumed
to update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. There is also a well-known body of
literature on non-Bayesian observational learning. In these models, rather than applying
Bayes’ update to obtain the posterior belief regarding the underlying state of the world
by using all the available information, agents may adopt some intuitive rule of thumb to
guide their choices (Ellison and Fudenberg[19][20]), may update their beliefs according
to only part of their information (Bala and Goyal[2][3]), may naively update their beliefs
by taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ beliefs (Golub and Jackson[23]), or may
be subject to bias in interpreting information (DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel[16]).
Finally, the importance of observational learning has been well documented in both
empirical and experimental studies, in addition to those already mentioned. Both focusing
on the adoption of new agricultural technology, Conley and Udry[14] and Munshi[31] not
only support the importance of observational learning but also indicate that observation
is often constrained because, in practice, a farmer may be unable to receive informa-
tion regarding the choice of every other farmer in the area. Munshi[30] and Ioannides
and Loury[25] demonstrate that social networks play an important role in individuals’
acquisition of employment information. Cai, Chen and Fang[9] conduct a natural field
experiment to indicate the empirical significance of observational learning in which con-
sumers obtain information about product quality from the purchasing decisions of others.
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3 Model
3.1 Private Signal Structure
Consider a discrete and infinite time line: t = 1, 2, .... At each period t, there is a set of
agents N t that move simultaneously. We refer to N t as a community. The community
size Qt = |N t| is randomly selected from a commonly known probability distribution G
on N+, with the largest community size in the support being finite. The Qt values are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. Qt is common knowledge for
agents in N t
′
, t′ ≥ t, at the beginning of period t′.
Let θ ∈ {0, 1} be the state of the world with equal prior probabilities, i.e., Prob(θ =
0) = Prob(θ = 1) = 1
2
. Given θ, an i.i.d. private signal st(Qt) ∈ S = (−1, 1) is realized
in period t after the realization of Qt, which is observed by every agent in N t and by
no one else. The st(Qt) values are independently distributed, but their distributions can
be heterogeneous depending on Qt. One interpretation of this setting is that each agent
receives and shares a signal with the community; the more agents there are, the more
precise the aggregated information about the true state is.
The probability distributions regarding the signal conditional on the state are denoted
as FQ0 (s) and F
Q
1 (s) (with continuous density functions f
Q
0 (s) and f
Q
1 (s)), where Q de-
notes the community size. The pair of measures {FQ0 , F
Q
1 }Q∈N+ are referred to as the
signal structure, and I assume that the signal structure has the following properties for
every Q:
1. The pdf’s fQ0 (s) and f
Q
1 (s) are continuous and non-zero everywhere on the
support, which immediately implies that no signal is fully revealing of the underlying
state.
2. Monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP):
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)
is strictly increasing in s. This
assumption is made without loss of generality: as long as no two signals generate
the same likelihood ratio, the signals can always be re-aligned to form a structure
that satisfies the MLRP.
The focus of this paper is to examine the interaction among signal, observation and
externalities and to identify conditions that need to be imposed on each factor to ensure
the highest possible level of learning. To address this issue and present the major findings,
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it is useful to first introduce a notation that categorizes the signal structure. The private
belief of an agent is defined by the probability of the true state being 1 according to her
signal only, and it is given by
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)+fQ
1
(s)
.
Definition 1. We say that agents have unbounded private beliefs if lims→1
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)+fQ
1
(s)
= 1
and lims→−1
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)+fQ
1
(s)
= 0 for some Q on the support of distribution G. We say that
agents have bounded private beliefs if lims→1
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)+fQ
1
(s)
< 1 and lims→−1
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)+fQ
1
(s)
> 0
for every Q on the support of distribution G.
Unbounded private beliefs correspond to a situation in which a community may receive
an arbitrarily strong signal about the underlying state, while bounded beliefs indicate
that the amount of information that can be derived from a single private signal is always
limited.
3.2 The Sequential Decision Process
The agents inN t each take a single action simultaneously between 0 and 1. Let atn ∈ {0, 1}
denote the action of agent n in N t.
Agent n cares about the action of every agent in N t. Given {ati : i ∈ N
t}, the payoff
of agent n is equal to u(θ, atn, m) > 0, where m is the number of actions in {a
t
i : i ∈ N
t}
that are the same as atn. I make the following assumptions about u:
1. Given every θ, atn, u is increasing in m. This assumption means that every agent
prefers that more of her peers take the same action as she does.
2. Given every m, u(0, 0, m) = u(1, 1, m) > u(1, 0, m) = u(0, 1, m). This assump-
tion means that every agent prefers to take the “correct” action, i.e., the action
that matches the state.
3. Whenm is sufficiently large, u(a, b,m) > u(a, 1−b, 1), a, b ∈ {0, 1}. This assump-
tion means that coordination motives (conforming to the majority) can dominate
information motives (matching the state) in a large community.
The direct influence of every agent’s action on the payoffs of other agents within
the same community differentiates this model from most theoretical literature on social
learning. In addition to the widely studied informational externalities that arise from
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sequential observation, there now exists a new parallel economic force, coordination mo-
tives, that generates an incentive for an agent to conform with her peers. This incentive
becomes stronger as the community size increases. The primary goal of this paper is
to ascertain how this incentive affects individual behavior as well as the overall learning
level and to determine whether it improves or impairs the likelihood of agents taking the
correct action over time.
After receiving signal st(Qt) and before engaging in the above action, the agents may
observe some of the actions taken by their predecessors. In this paper, I will discuss two
possible structures of observation.
3.2.1 Exogenous observation
The agents in N t observe the ordered action sequence in a neighborhood Bt ⊂ {∪N i∈NN
i :
N ⊂ {N1, · · · , N t−1}} (each agent in N t observes the same action sequence). The
neighborhood Bt is generated according to a probability distribution Ot over the set
{N1, · · · , N t−1}. The draws from each Ot are independent from one another for all t
and from the realization of community size and private signals. Let B¯t = ∪Bt:Ot(Bt)>0B
t
be the union of all possible neighborhoods that can be observed in period t. The se-
quence {Ot}t∈N+ is called the observation structure and is common knowledge, while the
realization of st and Bt are known by agents only in N t.
Let H t = {am ∈ {0, 1} : m ∈ Bt, Bt ⊂ B¯t} denote the set of actions that n can
possibly know from observation, and let ht be a particular action sequence in H t. Let
I t = {st(Qt), ht} be n’s information set. Note that the information set of every agent in
N t is the same. The set of all possible information sets of n is denoted as It.
A strategy for n is a mapping φtn : I
t → {0, 1} that selects a decision for every
possible information set. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies φ = {φt}t∈N+ =
{{φtn}n∈{1,··· ,Qt}}t∈N+ . I use φ
t
−n = {φ
t
n′}n′ 6=n to denote the strategies of all agents other
than n in period t, φ−t = {φt
′
}t′ 6=t to denote the strategies of all agents other than those
in N t, and φ−n,t = (φ
t
−n, {φ
t′}t′ 6=t) to denote the strategies of all agents other than n.
Given a strategy profile, the sequence of decisions {atn}n∈N is a stochastic process. I
denote the probability measure generated by this stochastic process as Pφ.
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3.2.2 Endogenous Observation
The agents in N t simultaneously acquire information about the previous decisions of
other agents through observation. Each agent n can pay a cost c > 0 to obtain a capacity
K(t) ∈ N+; otherwise, he pays nothing and chooses ∅.
With capacity K(t), agent n can select a neighborhood Bt(n) ⊂ ∪t−1i=1N
i of maximum
size K(t), i.e., |Bt(n)| ≤ K(t), and observe the action of each agent in Bt(n). The
actions in Bt(n) are observed simultaneously, and no agent can choose any additional
observation based on what she has already observed. Let Bt(n) denote the set of all
possible neighborhoods that n can observe. After the agents make their decisions regard-
ing observation, the actions that they choose to observe are revealed and become public
information within N t. That is, every agent in N t observes Bt = ∪Q
t
n=1B
t(n).
An agent’s strategy in the above sequential game consists of two problems: (1) given
her private signal, whether to make costly observation and, if so, whom to observe;
(2) after observation (or not), which action to take between 0 and 1 given the realiza-
tion of observed actions. With some abuse of notation, let H t = {am ∈ {0, 1} : m ∈
B ⊂ ∪t−1i=1Q
i, |B| ≤ QtK(t)} denote the set of actions that n can possibly know from
observation by herself and others, and let ht be a particular action sequence in H t.
I t = {st(Qt), ht} and It are defined similarly as that used above.
A strategy for n is the set of two mappings σtn = (σ
t,1
n , σ
t,2
n ), where σ
t,1
n : S → B
t(n)
selects n’s choice of observation for every possible private signal and σt,2n : I
t → {0, 1}
selects an action for every possible information set. A strategy profile is a sequence
of strategies σ = {σt}t∈N+ = {{σ
t
n}n∈{1,··· ,Qt}}t∈N+ . I use the notation σ
t
−n = {σ
t
n′}n′ 6=n,
σ−t = {σ
t′}t′ 6=t and σ−n,t = (σ
t
−n, {σ
t′}t′ 6=t) in a manner similar to that used for exogenous
observation.
Given a strategy profile, the sequence of decisions {atn}n∈N is a stochastic process. I
denote the probability measure generated by this stochastic process as Pσ.
A decisive difference between exogenous and endogenous observation lies in how ob-
servation correlates with signal. Under exogenous observation, no correlation between
signal and observation exists because they are simply two independent processes. Un-
der endogenous observation, however, observation–whether to observe and, if so, whom
to observe–may depend on the value of the private signal because it is now part of an
agent’s optimal decision. Conceivably, for an agent who attempts to extract information
13
about the true state from her observation, her inference on private signals and the ob-
servation of her predecessors, which then partially determines her posterior belief on the
state, will be formed very differently under the two observation structures. As shown in
subsequent sections of the paper, observation structure has a significant impact on the
pattern of social learning.
3.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ∗ (resp. φ∗) is a pure strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) if, for each t ∈ N+ and n ∈ {1, · · · , Qt}, σt∗n is such that given
σ∗−n,t, (1) σ
∗t,2
n (I
t) (resp. φ∗tn (I
t)) maximizes the expected payoff of n given every I t ∈ It
and (2) σ∗t,1n (s
t
n) maximizes the expected payoff of n, given every s
t
n and given σ
∗t,2
n .
Whether observation is exogenous or endogenous, the idea underlying PBE is simi-
lar: given all available information and the strategy of each predecessor and each peer,
an agent determines her payoff-maximizing strategy. In a model without coordination
motives, this strategy always coincides with the strategy that maximizes the probability
of taking the correct action, but in this situation, it may not because the actions of one’s
peers must also be considered. An equilibrium strategy under endogenous observation
differs from one under exogenous observation in its additional component of observation
choice after receiving the private signal. In such a case, an agent optimizes her observation
according to her signal value and others’ strategies.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, I simply refer to PBE as “equilibrium”.
Proposition 1. In every equilibrium σ∗ (resp. φ∗) and for every t, actions are always
unanimous in N t: for every I t, σ∗t,2n (I
t) = σ∗t,2m (I
t); for every m,n ∈ N t.
Proposition 1 indicates an agent’s incentive to conform to her peers in the same com-
munity. Note that the posterior belief on the true state is the same across the community,
and consider the two sub-groups of agents choosing different actions. If an agent choosing
action 1 weakly prefers 1 to 0, then each agent choosing 0 must strictly prefer 1 to 0.
This is a contradiction, and hence, the only equilibrium action profile is unanimous. This
result initially seems to indicate that coordination motives always exacerbate herding
and are harmful for learning because there is now an additional incentive to ignore one’s
signal and submit to the majority. However, this result also implies that agents in a
14
community may conform to an action profile that depends on their signal rather than on
observation, such that their actions become more informative for successors. As will be
shown later, such behavior indeed improves social learning to a great extent.
Notably, indifference between the two actions can exist in amixed strategy equilibrium.
In fact, when the community size is large, there always exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
in which an agent’s probability of mixing between 1 and 0 depends on the signal value.
However, because the mixed strategy equilibrium does not provide additional insight into
the relation between social learning and coordination motives, I will not discuss it in
detail in this paper.
3.4 Learning
The main focus of this paper is to determine what type of information aggregation will
result from equilibrium behavior. First, I define the different types of learning studied in
this paper.
Definition 3. An equilibrium σ∗ (resp. φ∗) has asymptotic learning if every agent
takes the correct action at the limit:
lim
t→∞
Pσ∗(a
t
n = θ) = 1 for all n.
In this paper, the unconditional probability of taking the correct action, Pσ∗(atn = θ),
is also referred to as the learning probability. Asymptotic learning requires that this
probability converge to 1, i.e., the posterior beliefs converge to a degenerate distribu-
tion on the true state. In terms of information aggregation, asymptotic learning can be
interpreted as equivalent to making all private signals public and thus aggregating infor-
mation efficiently. It marks the upper bound of social learning with any signal structure
and observation structure.
Asymptotic learning may not always be achieved, especially under an endogenous
observation structure, because a rational agent may choose not to make costly observa-
tions when her signal is already quite precise. In such a case, it is still interesting to
determine whether information can be efficiently aggregated via observation, i.e., to ask
the following question: when an agent decides to observe, will her observation reveal the
truth and lead her to act correctly? A formal analysis calls for the notion of truth-telling
observation, which is defined below.
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Let aˆt be a hypothetical action that is equal to the state with higher posterior prob-
ability given any I t.
Definition 4. An equilibrium σ∗ (resp. φ∗) has truth-telling observation if aˆt = θ
whenever observation is non-empty at the limit:
lim
t→∞
Pσ∗(aˆ
t = θ|Bt 6= ∅) = 1.
Truth-telling observation is a weaker condition than asymptotic learning in two as-
pects. First, it requires only the state-matching action aˆt to be perfectly correct con-
ditional on non-empty observation as t → ∞, as opposed to the unconditional correct
action in asymptotic learning. Second, even in an equilibrium with truth-telling obser-
vation, an agent’s action conditional on non-empty observation may not coincide with
aˆt. This stems from coordination motives: when the community size is large, the agents
may conform to an action that matches the state with a probability lower than 1
2
. In
contrast, asymptotic learning requires each agent’s equilibrium action to be always the
same as aˆt at the limit. Therefore, truth-telling observation should be regarded as a no-
tion describing only the maximum informativeness of observation but not the correctness
of equilibrium behavior, while asymptotic learning represents the highest level of both.
4 Results for Exogenous Observation
In this section, I present the main results for exogenous observation. A well-established
theoretical prediction in much of the literature, which typically assumes that only one
agent moves in each period, is that herding occurs when private beliefs are bounded:
with a positive probability, all agents ultimately choose the wrong action after a par-
ticular time threshold. This occurs because learning cannot be improved indefinitely:
at a certain point, some agent’s observation becomes so informative that she abandons
her private signal altogether and herds with her predecessors, and by this time, social
learning essentially ceases. In this section, I will demonstrate how coordination motives
can prevent herding, can incentivize agents to use their private information, and can lead
to a learning level that can be arbitrarily close to asymptotic learning.
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4.1 Two Conditions on Observation Structure
When observation is exogenous, the observation structure–indicating which predecessors
each agent observes–plays an important role in determining whether asymptotic learning
is possible. This structure is sometimes referred to as a network in the literature to high-
light the connection between theory and application. To illustrate how the observation
structure influences learning, I provide several typical observation structures below.
1. Bt = N1 for all t: a “star network” in which each agent observes only the actions
in the first community in the action sequence.
2. Bt = N t−1: a “line network” in which each agent observes only the closest
community.
3. Bt = ∪t−1i=1N
i: a “complete network” in which each agent observes every prede-
cessor. This is the upper bound of observational information that can be obtained.
In the first structure, asymptotic learning is never possible regardless of private beliefs
and community size because learning cannot be improved beyond the second period: all
agents after period 1 are essentially identical in terms of information acquired because
they have identical observation. In the second and third observation structures, if each
community is a singleton, then asymptotic learning occurs when private beliefs are un-
bounded but never occurs when private beliefs are bounded. Herding occurs in the latter
case with a probability bounded away from zero.
I now introduce two conditions on the observation structure that lead to approximate
asymptotic learning in the presence of coordination motives, regardless of whether private
beliefs are unbounded. The first condition stands in contrast to the “star network” above.
Definition 5. An observation structure has expanding observations if, for every
K ∈ N+, limt→∞Ot(max{τ : Qτ ⊂ Bt} < K) = 0.
The concept of expanding observations for singleton communities was first introduced
by Acemoglu et al.[1], and in my paper, I generalize this concept to the case with non-
singleton communities. This approach implies that an agent always observes a predecessor
who is not too far away. The “star network” clearly does not have expanding observa-
tions, but the “line network” and “complete network” do. This property on observation
17
structure ensures that if any improvement on learning is ever possible, it is transmitted
to every agent over time via observation in the sense that no agent will be blocked from
any recent development in learning by only observing some distant predecessors.
However, expanding observations alone is not sufficient for asymptotic learning when
private beliefs are bounded. For instance, the “line network” has expanding observations,
but with bounded private beliefs, herding occurs with positive probability regardless of
how large the community becomes. Therefore, I introduce the second condition.
Definition 6. An observation structure has infinite complete observations if there
exists a infinite subset of time periods {t1, t2, · · · } such that (1) for every K ∈ N+,
limn→∞O
tn(|Btn| < K) = 0, and (2) limn→∞Otn(B¯τ ⊂ Btn ∀N τ ⊂ Btn) = 1.
The meaning of infinite observations is straightforward. Complete observations indi-
cate the existence of a subset of agents such that an agent in this subset who observes a
predecessor also observes all actions that can possibly be observed by the predecessor. At
the limit, an agent’s observed neighborhood contains infinitely many actions. To under-
stand why this condition is needed for approximate asymptotic learning with bounded
private beliefs, first consider an observation structure that has only finite observations,
such as a “line network”. On the one hand, bounded private beliefs prevent private infor-
mation within any finite neighborhood from being arbitrarily informative about the true
state. On the other hand, finite observations and bounded private beliefs together imply
that once any observation by any predecessor in this neighborhood becomes sufficiently
informative, it cannot be improved upon by substituting the predecessor’s action. To
approach asymptotic learning, the only possibility is to have infinitely many actions in
an observed neighborhood.
Next, consider the case in which an agent has an “incomplete” observation of a prede-
cessor. Hence, there are some actions that cannot be observed by the agent but that may
have been observed by the predecessor. Now the predecessor’s action has an ambiguous
effect on the agent’s posterior belief because the agent needs to consider those unobserved
actions and make a corresponding inference based on her observation. As a result, the
direction of her posterior belief–whether it favors state 0 or 1 after observing the predeces-
sor’s action–cannot be determined solely by the predecessor’s action but depends on her
observation. In other words, observing action 1 by the predecessor may cause the agent
to favor either state in different situations, which makes her updated belief intractable.
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In contrast, complete observations determine the direction of the agent’s posterior belief
without ambiguity. I provide further detail below when presenting the formal result.
A simple example of an observation structure with both expanding observations and
infinite complete observations is the “complete network” in which every agent observes
the entire action history. In general, the two conditions are satisfied by a wide class of
observation structures.
4.2 Main Result
I now present the main theoretical result of this section.
Theorem 1. Assume that the observation structure has expanding observations and in-
finite complete observations. There exists Qˆ such that if G(Q ≥ Qˆ) > 0, for every
ǫ > 0, there exists an equilibrium φ∗ such that (1) truth-telling observation occurs and
(2) limt→∞Pφ∗(atn = θ) > 1− ǫ.
This result shows that coordination motives can serve as an economic force that
counters the herding incentive in a way that hurts individual agents ceteris paribus but
benefits social learning. When the community size is large, the signal can be regarded
as a correlating device to coordinate agents in the same community to conform to an
action based on the signal value alone. This action may sometimes differ from the more
“informed” action based on both signal and observation, but it does constitute mutual
best responses and makes the actions of this community informative for successors. This
is the key difference between a model with coordination motives and a model without
them: in the latter, because every agent always seeks to maximize her probability of
matching the state, herding can never be prevented when private beliefs are bounded.
Following the rough intuition above, I present a heuristic proof of Theorem 1 (the
complete proof with technical details can be found in the Appendix). First, properties of
Bayes’ update determine that regardless of which is the true state, an agent’s posterior
probability on the wrong state can never become arbitrarily close to 1 over time because
otherwise the same set of observation inducing this posterior probability would need to
occur with > 1 probability when the true state is altered, which is a contradiction.
Next, I construct an equilibrium in which each observed action is informative. Con-
sider an action profile that follows observation–that is, choose the action matching the
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state with higher probability given observation only–when the signal is weak and that fol-
lows the signal when the signal is strong. This situation constitutes mutual best responses
when Qt is large because the incentive to conform becomes stronger than the incentive
to match the state. In this equilibrium, strong private signals are never abandoned. As
a result, for an agent who has complete observation of another agent following such an
action profile, Bayes’ update from observing this additional action will induce a posterior
belief in favor of the corresponding state, in contrast to the belief that occurs without
adding this observation. This claim implies a more important property of equilibrium
behavior: following any belief about the state, additional observation of sufficiently many
actions of the same value can induce a new belief that entails a higher (> 1
2
) probability
of the corresponding state.
Now we can demonstrate the truth-telling nature of observation. Consider a subset of
agents with infinite complete observations, and note that the hypothetical action aˆt can
be regarded as the optimal action for some outside singleton agent who observes Bt and
attempts to maximize her probability of matching the state. Suppose that truth-telling
observation does not occur, which implies that her highest learning probability is equal to
some ρ < 1. Fix a sufficiently large t′ such that observing Bt
′
gives her a ≈ ρ probability
of matching the state, and consider another sufficiently large number ∆ and the following
sub-optimal strategy: given the action sequence in Bt
′
, she will change her action if and
only if she observes ∆ consecutive additional actions that are the same value, which is
opposite of the action that she would have taken by observing only Bt
′
. It can be shown
that this sub-optimal strategy already improves her learning probability by a significant
amount, which makes the total probability exceed ρ–thus revealing a contradiction. No-
tably, the result is not obtained by the law of large numbers, as observed actions are
not mutually independent: later actions are affected by earlier actions via observational
learning. Instead, this strict improvement stems from calculating the difference between
the probabilities of the ∆ actions being “helpful” (in the sense that they correct a wrong
belief) and “harmful” (in the sense that they mislead from a correct belief); details are
provided in the Appendix.
Finally, I identify a direct inverse relation between the limit learning probability and
the probability of agents acting according to signal only. Truth-telling observation implies
that at the limit, the probability of taking the correct action conditional on non-empty
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observation is equal to 1; hence, the total learning probability at the limit is the sum of
the probability that agents consider their observation and the probability that a strong
signal occurs favoring the true state. The cutoff for a strong signal is arbitrary–as long as
each agent uses her signal for a fixed positive probability, truth-telling observation occurs.
Hence, the higher this cutoff is, the more likely an agent chooses her action according to
observation, and thus, the higher the learning probability is. In this way, any learning
probability that is less than 1 can be obtained in equilibrium.
Note that the condition of infinite complete observations is not required for asymp-
totic learning when private beliefs are unbounded. This has been proved for singleton
communities in the literature (see, e.g., Smith and Sorensen[33]) and is extended to this
model with coordination motives. I note this result below and use it in subsequent proofs.
Proposition 2. Assume that the observation structure has expanding observations and
that private beliefs are unbounded. There always exists an equilibrium with asymptotic
learning.
5 Results on Endogenous Observation
In this section, I analyze the model under endogenous observation by discussing the cases
of unbounded and bounded private beliefs separately. Note that costly and strategic
observation creates an independent economic force by itself: it discourages an agent from
observation when her signal is informative because the additional benefit from observation
becomes small or even negligible. With this added strategic component, the effect of
coordination motives becomes more subtle, but in general, a similar implication can be
derived: with sufficiently strong coordination motives, the level of social learning can be
improved.
5.1 Unbounded Private Beliefs
5.1.1 Singleton Communities
To fully understand how coordination motives change the pattern of learning, it is impor-
tant to first understand how singleton agents–that is, G(1) = 1–behave when observation
is endogenous; this behavior has scarcely been explored in the previous literature. First,
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I show that asymptotic learning never occurs in this environment.
Theorem 2.A (Song (2015)). Asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.
Although the result stands in stark contrast to the well-known result in the literature
with exogenous observation, the underlying argument for this result is rather straightfor-
ward. By assumption, no private signal perfectly reveals the true state; for asymptotic
learning to occur in any equilibrium, a necessary condition is that an agent chooses
to observe for almost every private signal. If an agent chooses to observe, her pay-
off is upper bounded by u(1, 1, 1) − c because the best possible observation is one that
fully reveals the true state and guarantees her a benefit of u(1, 1, 1). If she chooses
not to observe and simply follows her private signal s, her expected payoff is equal to
max{f1
1
(s),f1
0
(s)}
f1
1
(s)+f1
0
(s)
u(1, 1, 1) + (1 − max{f
1
1
(s),f1
0
(s)}
f1
1
(s)+f1
0
(s)
)u(1, 0, 1). Because private beliefs are un-
bounded, for any positive c, there is always a positive measure of signals such that the
payoff from no observation is higher, which implies that asymptotic learning never occurs.
Although asymptotic learning is impossible, efficient information aggregation can still
be achieved in the form of truth-telling observation. Assuming a symmetric signal struc-
ture, the following result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for truth-telling
observation in this environment as well as a full characterization of the limit learning
probability.
Theorem 2.B (Song (2015)). Assume that the signal structure is symmetric: f 10 (s) =
f 11 (−s) for every s ∈ S. Truth-telling observation occurs in σ
∗ if and only if limt→∞K(t) =
∞. limt→∞Pσ∗(at = θ) = F 10 (s
∗) where s∗ is characterized by
f 11 (s
∗)
f 10 (s
∗) + f 11 (s
∗)
u(1, 1, 1) +
f 10 (s
∗)
f 10 (s
∗) + f 11 (s
∗)
u(1, 0, 1) = u(1, 1, 1)− c.
The property of truth-telling observation also holds in the case of exogenous obser-
vation with unbounded private beliefs and expanding observations, but the underlying
mechanism here is much different. Under exogenous observation, an agent always uses her
private information with a positive probability (which converges to 0 over time) because
her signal can be strong enough to overwhelm the realized observation. Under endogenous
observation, an agent may choose to use her private information and not observe at all
because although observation can still be beneficial, its marginal benefit in information
does not cover the cost. This probability of no observation does not converge to 0 over
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time. As a result, an agent’s individual action is always erroneous with a probability
bounded away from 0, which then implies that observing any finite sequence of actions
does not reveal the true state regardless of when the actions occurred. In other words,
truth-telling observation never occurs when limt→∞K(t) 6=∞. However, this individual
error is precisely the source of informativeness: because an agent sometimes chooses to
forgo the (potentially more informative) observation, her action is indicative of the range
of signals that she receives. Therefore, once an agent observes an arbitrarily large neigh-
borhood, information can be aggregated efficiently to reveal the true state. Once again,
this follows not from the law of large numbers but from an argument of continuing strict
improvement similar to that in Theorem 1.
In terms of the limit learning probability, it is straightforward that F 10 (s
∗) is the
largest possible learning probability in equilibrium, and it is achievable only when truth-
telling observation occurs. After all, it is impossible in any equilibrium for any agent to
choose to observe when her signal is not in [−s∗, s∗]. Hence, we can conclude that with
unbounded private beliefs, endogenous observation lowers the limit learning probability
compared with the most informative scenario under exogenous observation. However,
endogenous observation may lead to a higher limit learning probability than exogenous
observation without expanding observations because although agents will not observe
the given extreme signals, they make more informed choices when they do observe. For
instance, consider the “star network” in the previous example of observation structures. It
can be shown that if observation is endogenous and K(t) = 1, each agent will observe her
immediate predecessor whenever she chooses to observe, and the limit learning probability
is higher than that in the “star network” when c is low.
5.1.2 Non-Singleton Communities
In this section, I present the main result for non-singleton communities and compare it
with the result for singleton communities above.
Theorem 3. There is a cutoff c¯ > 0 such that for every c ∈ (0, c¯), there exists Qˆ(c) such
that if G(Q ≥ Qˆ(c)) = 1, there exists an equilibrium σ∗ with asymptotic learning.
Before elaborating on this result, I must first describe such an equilibrium that leads
to asymptotic learning. For agent in the same community N t, consider two action profiles:
a “truth-seeking” profile in which agents conform to the action that matches the state
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with higher probability according to all available information and a sub-optimal profile in
which they act otherwise–for example, they conform to the action that is the worst match
for the state. The first profile clearly yields a higher payoff for every agent in expectation.
Now consider the following strategy profile for observation and action: agent 1 observes
a prescribed neighborhood given st(Qt), and no other agent observes. If the realized
observed neighborhood is revealed to be the same as the prescribed one, then the agents
follow the “truth-seeking” action profile; otherwise, they follow the sub-optimal profile.
When the community size is large, both action profiles constitute best responses,
which then implies (by backward induction) that making the prescribed observation is
indeed optimal for agent 1. Hence, we have an equilibrium in which the observation of
an arbitrary non-empty neighborhood occurs regardless of signal value. By imposing the
property of expanding observations on this sequence of the observed neighborhood (for
example, agent 1 in each period observes agent 1 in the previous period), we can apply
Proposition 2 to obtain asymptotic learning.
This result identifies an effect on strategic observation that is imposed by coordination
motives: more observation can be encouraged as the community size grows. In the
equilibrium described above, by conforming to different actions according to the observed
neighborhood, the agents essentially make it more costly for agent 1 not to observe, and
thus, the range of signals for which agent 1 will observe the prescribed neighborhood
expands. When the community size becomes sufficiently large, this signal range becomes
the whole support S, and hence, an unbroken chain of observation is established even
when observation is costly. As a result, the efficient aggregation of information is restored.
From the construction of equilibrium, we can also see that the result is robust to
the specific cost structure of observation. In a more general model, let ct(k) denote a
cost function for observing k predecessors in period t. As long as ct(1) has a constant
upper bound, Theorem 3 can be applied to show that asymptotic learning can occur in
equilibrium.
5.2 Bounded Private Beliefs
When private beliefs are bounded and only a finite-size neighborhood can be observed
at the limit, the level of social learning is always bounded away from 1 because of ei-
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ther herding or a persistent probability of error2. Therefore, in this section, I assume
that limt→∞K(t) = ∞ to show a sharp contrast between learning with and without
coordination motives.
As in the previous section, I first discuss the effect of endogenous observation on
learning in an environment in which agents are singletons. The limit learning probability
can be affected in either direction: whether it rises or falls compared with exogenous
observation depends greatly on the value of c, the cost of observation. The following
example illustrates this result and its underlying mechanism without loss of generality.
Assume that only one agent moves in each period. Consider the following two cases:
exogenous observation where Bt = {1, · · · , t − 1} and endogenous observation where
K(t) = t − 1. It is established in the literature (see, e.g., Smith and Sorensen[33]) that
when observation is exogenous, the limit learning probability has an upper bound P¯ < 1.
In other words, at the limit, an agent behaves better than merely following her own signal,
but she cannot learn the true state perfectly.
Under endogenous observation, Theorem 2 can be extended here to characterize the
limit learning probability for a range of the cost c. Consider a symmetric signal structure.
Note that unbounded private beliefs constitute a sufficient but not necessary condition
for the proof of Theorem 1. In fact, truth-telling observation requires only that beliefs be
“strong” relative to cost, i.e., lims→1
f1
1
(s)
f1
1
(s)+f1
0
(s)
×u(1, 1, 1)+lims→1
f1
0
(s)
f1
1
(s)+f1
0
(s)
×u(1, 0, 1) >
u(1, 1, 1) − c. In other words, as long as an agent prefers not to observe–even if ob-
servation reveals the truth–when her signal takes the most extreme value, the neces-
sary and sufficient relation between truth-telling observation and infinite observation
at the limit can be derived following the same argument as used previously. Hence,
when c > lims→1
f1
0
(s)
f1
1
(s)+f1
0
(s)
× (u(1, 1, 1) − u(1, 0, 1)), letting s(c) be characterized by
f11 (s(c))
f1
1
(s(c))+f1
0
(s(c))
u(1, 1, 1)+
f10 (s(c))
f1
1
(s(c))+f1
0
(s(c))
u(1, 0, 1) = u(1, 1, 1)− c, we have an expression for
the limit learning probability that is denoted P (c):
P (c) = F 10 (s(c)).
Depending on c, the value of s(c) ranges from 0 to arbitrarily close to 1. As a
result, the value of P (c) ranges from F 10 (0) to arbitrarily close to 1. We see here that
endogenous observation affects social learning in a way that is monotonic in c: compared
2This claim is valid for both exogenous and endogenous observation. Formal results can be found in
Song[35].
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with exogenous observation, endogenous observation is better for social learning when c
is relatively large and is worse for social learning when c is relatively small.
I now present the main result for coordination motives. Regardless of the value of c,
coordination motives facilitate learning in the sense that it increases the highest possible
equilibrium learning probability.
Theorem 4. There is a cutoff c¯ > 0 such that for every c ∈ (0, c¯), there exists Qˆ(c)
such that if G(Q ≥ Qˆ(c)) = 1, for every ǫ > 0, there exists an equilibrium σ∗ where (1)
truth-telling observation occurs and (2) limt→∞Pσ∗(atn = θ) > 1− ǫ.
This result can be derived from a combination of Theorems 1 and 3. First, based
on Theorem 3, agents can be incentivized to observe a prescribed neighborhood given
any signal; then, according to Theorem 1, when the prescribed neighborhood is observed,
the signal serves as a correlation device for the agents to coordinate on an action profile
that accounts for all available information with a certain probability. This probability
can be arbitrarily close to 1. Consequently, for any fixed observation cost c, when the
community size is large, there is always an equilibrium with a higher learning probability
than is available for singleton communities.
5.3 Summary
Before discussing some extensions of the model, I briefly summarize the comparison across
observation structures and community sizes in this section. To introduce a different
and useful perspective for examining the impact of various factors on social learning, I
categorize the main results here by signal structure and regard the case with exogenous
observation and singleton communities as a benchmark.
When private beliefs are unbounded, in the benchmark case, the level of social learning
depends entirely on the pattern of observation. Asymptotic learning occurs if and only
if at the limit an agent almost surely observes a close predecessor (e.g., the “complete”
network). The presence of coordination motives does not change this property of learning.
When observation becomes endogenous, asymptotic learning cannot be achieved because
the positive observation cost prevents an agent from observing when her signal is strong.
Imposing coordination motives now makes a difference in the sense that it encourages
observation and thus restores asymptotic learning when the community size is sufficiently
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large. Figure 1 uses some representative observation structures to illustrate the learning
pattern over time in different environments.
Figure 1: Learning Patterns with Unbounded Private Beliefs
(En = endogenous observation; Ex = exogenous observation)
When private beliefs are bounded, the benchmark case typically produces a learning
probability bounded away from 1, regardless of whether agents observe close or distant
predecessors. Making observation endogenous can cause this probability to be either
higher or lower depending on the observation cost c. With coordination motives, the
highest possible learning probability increases for any value of c when the community
size is sufficiently large; in particular, it can be arbitrarily close to 1 in equilibrium.
Figure 2 illustrates these scenarios.
Figure 2: Learning Patterns with Bounded Private Beliefs
(En = endogenous observation; Ex = exogenous observation)
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6 Discussion
6.1 Equilibrium Selection and Risk Dominance
The conforming incentive generated by coordination motives results in multiple equilibria
in an environment with large communities. Many of my previous results are built on the
fact that conforming based on the most informed action and on a less informed action are
both optimal responses for agents in the same community, which does not occur when
agents are singletons because one’s unique best response would then be to use all available
information. A natural question is then whether different equilibria can be compared in
any way and, if so, whether a selected equilibrium by any criterion changes the implication
of having coordination motives in the model. In this section, I propose risk dominance
as an equilibrium selection method and discuss its properties and impact. In particular,
this criterion is imposed on the interim stage in which signal and observation have been
realized: it essentially enables comparison between two action profiles and selects a unique
equilibrium action for each information set.
Consider any N t with any community size Qt and any information set I t. Let
at(I t) = {atn(I
t)}Q
t
n=1 and a
′t(I t) = {a
′t
n(I
t)}Q
t
n=1 denote two arbitrary action profiles with
unanimous action. Let vtn(a
t(I t), I t) denote agent n’s expected payoff given at(I t) and I t.
Definition 7. I say that at(I t) risk-dominates a
′t(I t) if for every N
′t ⊂ N t and every
n ∈ N
′t, we have
vtn(a
t(I t), I t)− vtn(({a
′t
i (I
t)}i∈Q′t , {a
t
j(I
t)}j /∈N ′t), I
t)
≥vtn(a
′t(I t), I t)− vtn(({a
t
i(I
t)}i∈Q′t , {a
′t
j (I
t)}j /∈N ′t), I
t).
If at(I t) risk-dominates every other action profile for every I t, we say that at(I t) is risk
dominant.
The idea behind risk dominance is the following: suppose that a subset of agents
N
′t ⊂ N t switches their action from a given profile to an alternative profile. If action
profile 1 risk-dominates action profile 2, then the expected loss for every agent in N
′t in
switching from action profile 1 to 2 is always larger than the loss involved in switching
from 2 to 1, for every possible N
′t and information set I t. One interpretation of risk
dominance is that it indicates an agent’s preference for one action profile over the other
when she is uncertain about which will be used by others in her community.
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An intuitive candidate for a risk-dominant action profile is one in which each agent
makes the best use of I t, for which I provide a formal definition below. This is actually
the generically unique risk-dominant action profile.
Definition 8. An action profile is truth-seeking if for every t, n and I t, n chooses the
action atn that maximizes the probability of a
t
n = θ given I
t.
Proposition 3. The truth-seeking action profile is risk dominant.
It is easy to see that the truth-seeking action profile yields the highest possible ex-
pected payoff for every agent in N t given I t. In fact, if we fix the number of agents that
take a given action a, each agent’s payoff is the highest when a is truth-seeking. Hence,
given a subset N
′t of action-switching agents, their loss is always less when switching
from some other action profile to the truth-seeking profile rather than the opposite. I
name the equilibrium with the truth-seeking profile as a truth-seeking equilibrium and
denote it as φ∗T and σ
∗
T under exogenous and endogenous observation, respectively. I then
inspect how learning in this particular equilibrium changes according to the community
size.
When observation is exogenous, coordination motives have no effect on the general
learning pattern in a truth-seeking equilibrium: regardless of G, asymptotic learning
occurs if private beliefs are unbounded and if the observation structure has expanding
observations and does not occur otherwise3. The truth-seeking action profile prevents
agents from conforming to a less informed action that uses more of their private informa-
tion, and hence, the whole community acts as a single agent that makes her best effort to
match her action with the true state. The conforming incentive does not alter anything
in the agents’ behavior regardless of how large a community becomes.
When observation is endogenous, however, coordination motives still play an impor-
tant role on learning in a truth-seeking equilibrium. For example, consider the following
scenario. Suppose that the signal distribution is the same for every Q, i.e., fQa = fa,
a = 0, 1. {f0, f1} is symmetric with unbounded private beliefs. In addition, the agents
have infinite observations (limt→∞K(t) =∞).
3To be precise, it has been proven that asymptotic learning does not occur when the observation
structure does not have expanding observations or when private beliefs are bounded and the observation
structure takes several typical forms. For a more specific account, see, e.g., Acemoglu et al.[1] and
Song[35].
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Proposition 4. For every σ∗T , we have limt→∞Pσ∗T (a
t
n = θ) = EG[F0(s
∗(Q))], where
s∗(Q) is characterized by the following equation:
f1(s
∗(Q))
f0(s∗(Q)) + f1(s∗(Q))
u(1, 1, Q) +
f0(s
∗(Q))
f0(s∗(Q)) + f1(s∗(Q))
u(1, 0, Q) = u(1, 1, Q)− c.
Given the probability distribution of community size G, let PT (G) denote the prob-
ability of the correct action occurring at the limit in any truth-seeking equilibrium. We
have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For G′, G such that G′ first-order stochastically dominates G, PT (G
′) >
PT (G).
In a truth-seeking equilibrium, coordination motives still encourage agents to observe–
not because no observation or a “wrong” observation entails that they conform to a
sub-optimal action as in the previous results but because observation generates greater
expected benefit in a larger community. As a result, the range of signals leading to non-
empty observation increases while the truth-telling property of observation is preserved.
Therefore, a larger community size increases the limit learning probability, while the
incremental improvement decreases in σ∗T compared with the constructed equilibrium in
Section 5 because asymptotic learning does not occur.
When private beliefs are bounded, coordination motives can work in opposite direc-
tions. As argued in Section 5, truth-telling observation occurs in σ∗T whenever private
beliefs are “strong” relative to cost, i.e., when the payoff of simply following an extreme
signal exceeds that of knowing the true state by costly observation. Similar to the above
proposition, the first payoff can be written as f1(s
∗)
f0(s∗)+f1(s∗)
u(1, 1, Q)+ f0(s
∗)
f0(s∗)+f1(s∗)
u(1, 0, Q),
while the second payoff is u(1, 1, Q)− c, which implies that the marginal effect of increas-
ing Q is higher in the latter. We can then conclude that increasing the likelihood of a
larger community size is better for social learning when private beliefs remain “strong”
because, once again, it encourages observation that is still truth-telling. However, so-
cial learning is harmed when private beliefs become weak because the informativeness of
observation may overwhelm that of any private signal and induce herding.
6.2 Herding with Imperfect Knowledge of Signals
The previous analysis has shown that coordination motives can reduce herding and facili-
tate efficient aggregation of private information. An important assumption leading to this
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result is that all information – both private signals and observations – is shared within
community and can be used as a correlating device. In this section, I show that when
private signals are “private” in the most strict sense and cannot be shared, coordination
motives have exactly the opposite effect: herding occurs even when private beliefs are
unbounded.
Assume that in every community N t, each agent n receives a private signal stn that
cannot be observed by any other agent. Without loss of generality, assume that stn follows
independent and identical distribution {F0, F1} conditional on the state, for every t and n.
Consider an exogenous “line” network, i.e. Bt = N t−1. In every symmetric equilibrium,
i.e. equilibrium where agents in the same community use identical strategies, I find the
following property:
Proposition 5. There exists Qˆ such that if G(Q ≥ Qˆ) = 1, asymptotic learning never
occurs in any equilibrium.
This result stands in stark contrast to the case of signal sharing, that there exists an
equilibrium with asymptotic learning whenever private beliefs are unbounded and some
close predecessors are observed. The reason behind is that keeping signals private brings
potential uncertainty about other agents’ actions. To achieve asymptotic learning, an
agent’s action must at least sometimes contradict her observation (presumably when her
signal is rather strong). However, when a highly informative observation realizes, since
the observation is shared within the community and signals are independent, the agent
can infer that no matter what the true state is, the other agents in her community will
probably take the action that matches the observation. The existence of coordination
motives then determines that her optimal action is to follow the observation as well. As
a result, herding occurs with positive probability in every equilibrium even when private
beliefs are unbounded.
Herding in this environment highlights the importance of common beliefs on asserting
the impact of coordination motives. When private signals are shared, agents have identical
beliefs which make it possible for them to coordinate on either action in equilibrium when
their community is large. As a result, they may agree to rely on private information only
even though their observation is rather informative already. However, once each private
signal is observed by the corresponding agent only, beliefs become heterogeneous across
agents. The impossibility to ascertain one another’s private signal incentivizes every
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agent to choose the “safer” option of following the commonly known observation, which
then leads to herding.
6.3 Separation Motives
Thus far, I have focused on scenarios in which agents are willing to conform to a unan-
imous action. However, in some cases, there may be a “congestion effect” on action,
i.e., more agents choosing the same action results in a smaller payoff for each agent. For
instance, too many customers squeezing into a restaurant will probably result in a neg-
ative dining experience in terms of waiting time and noise level even if the restaurant is
superior to its competitors in food quality. Consequently, a customer may actually prefer
another restaurant with ordinary food but smaller crowds.
In this section, I show how the model developed above can be used to analyze this
opposite environment with separation motives and its impact on learning. Consider the
payoff function u(θ, atn, m), and replace the second assumption on u with the assumption
that u is decreasing in m.
Assume that observation is exogenous. For community N t, let P denote an arbitrary
posterior probability that the true state is 1 given their signal and observation. The
following result describes the pattern of equilibrium behavior:
Proposition 6. If P > 1
2
, in every equilibrium φ∗, at least half of the agents in N t choose
action 1.
This result asserts that regardless of community size, at least half of the agents will
always take the more informed action. Here, separation motives work exactly the opposite
of coordination motives: instead of urging agents to conform to an action taken by the
majority, separation motives divide agents into two groups, always with more agents
in the group representing better information. This situation results from the trade-off
between a less crowded group and a more informative action. Moreover, it can be shown
that for some classes of utility function (e.g., u is linear in 1
m
), as the community size
rises, one can make increasingly precise inferences on the agents’ posterior belief from
observing all actions in the community. Then, if observation is exogenous and more or
less “complete”, i.e., at least at the limit, an agent observes almost the entire action
history, the learning pattern is similar to that with singleton communities. Asymptotic
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learning occurs when private beliefs are unbounded but never occurs otherwise.
When observation is endogenous, a natural conjecture is that negative externalities
discourage observation, and this possibility is confirmed by the model. As the community
size increases, the marginal benefit from observation decreases because the equilibrium
actions are always split in certain proportions between 0 and 1. Hence, although truth-
telling observation still occurs if infinite observations can be made at the limit, the range
of signals under which observation is non-empty is narrowed by separation motives. More-
over, a “tragedy of commons” argument implies that more precise knowledge about the
true state may actually decrease the total payoff in a community, and hence, the issue
of discrepancy between equilibrium and efficiency arises, but I will not discuss this issue
further in this paper.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied the problem of Bayesian learning with coordination motives in
various signal and observation structures. A large and growing body of literature on so-
cial learning focuses on whether equilibria lead to efficient information aggregation, but
most studies assume exogenous observation and no coordination motives. In many rele-
vant situations, these two assumptions are overly simple. Individuals sometimes obtain
their information not by some exogenous stochastic process but as a result of strategic
choices. In addition, their payoffs may be directly affected by the actions of other individ-
uals. This raises the questions of how different combinations of factors influence learning
differently, under what circumstance asymptotic learning can be achieved, and how the
results compare with benchmark cases studied in the literature.
To address these questions, I formulated a sequential-move learning model that in-
corporates all these elements. The basic decision sequence of the model follows the
convention of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch[7], Smith and Sorensen[33] and Ace-
moglu et al.[1]: on a discrete time line, a signal about the underlying binary state is
realized at the beginning of every period and is observed by each agent in that period
only. Each agent takes a binary action at the end of their period, and meanwhile, she can
observe some of her predecessors’ actions that are potentially informative. Nevertheless,
my model differs from that used in most research in two fundamental aspects. First, in
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the literature, there is usually only one agent in each period, whereas in my model, there
is a community consisting of multiple agents. Within a community, agents share their
information (reflected by the signal) and observation and take their actions simultane-
ously. Also in contrast to the literature, in which each agent’s sole objective is to match
her action with the state, an agent’s payoff from a given action is determined by both
the state and the number of others in her community that take the same action. Second,
observation is assumed to be exogenously given in much of the literature, whereas in this
paper, I also analyze the case in which each agent can pay a cost to strategically choose
a subset of her predecessors to observe.
I characterized pure-strategy (perfect Bayesian) equilibria for each observation struc-
ture (exogenous and endogenous) and characterized the conditions under which asymp-
totic learning can be obtained or approximated. When observation is exogenous, asymp-
totic learning occurs if private beliefs are unbounded and observations are “expanding”,
i.e., every observed neighborhood contains the action of some close predecessor over time.
This result holds regardless of the community size. If private beliefs are bounded, for most
common observation schemes, the probability of learning is bounded away from 1 when
the community size is small, but it can become arbitrarily close to asymptotic learning
when the community size is larger than a certain threshold. Coordination motives reduce
herding and improve social learning in this case.
When observation is endogenous, coordination motives also help to achieve better
social learning but in a very different way. With a small community size, asymptotic
learning never occurs because agents do not always observe: when the private signal is
strong, it is not worthwhile to pay the observation cost for a small marginal expected
benefit. However, when the community size becomes large, coordination motives encour-
age observation even when the private signal is strong because the marginal benefit from
observation increases with the number of agents in a community. Therefore, asymptotic
learning (or nearly asymptotic learning) occurs even when observation is costly.
I also discussed the issue of equilibrium selection and proposed risk dominance as a
selection criterion for the action profile after both signal and observation are realized. In
the selected equilibria, coordination motives do not affect learning at all when observation
is exogenous, have a positive effect on learning when observation is endogenous and
private beliefs are unbounded, and may either positively or negatively influence learning
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when observation is endogenous and private beliefs are bounded.
Beyond the specific results presented in this paper, I believe that the framework de-
veloped here can be applied to analyze learning dynamics in a more general and complex
environment. The following questions are among those that can be studied in future
work using this framework: (1) equilibrium learning when agents’ preferences are hetero-
geneous, both over time and within a community; (2) the effect of coordination motives
when agents in the same community make sequential decisions; and (3) equilibrium learn-
ing when the strength of coordination motives depends on the true state.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that there exist some σ∗ and I t such that in N t,
Q′ ∈ (1, Qt) agents choose action 1 and the others choose action 0 in equilibrium. Let
P = Pσ(θ = 1|I t); for every agent that chooses action 1, we have
Pu(1, 1, Q′) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q′) ≥ Pu(1, 0, Qt −Q′ + 1) + (1− P )u(1, 1, Qt −Q′ + 1).
For every agent that chooses action 0, we have
Pu(1, 0, Qt −Q′) + (1− P )u(1, 1, Qt −Q′) ≥ Pu(1, 1, Q′ + 1) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q′ + 1).
Combining the inequalities yields
Pu(1, 1, Q′) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q′) ≥ Pu(1, 1, Q′ + 1) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q′ + 1),
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. I prove the result by establishing several lemmas.
Lemma 1. There exists Qˆ such that for any Qt ≥ Qˆ and for any I t, every action profile
with unanimous action constitutes mutual best responses in N t.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that every agent in N t chooses action 1 given
I t. Let P denote the probability that θ = 1 given I t. For each agent, her expected
payoff from action 1 is Pu(1, 1, Qt) + (1−P )u(1, 0, Qt), while her payoff from action 0 is
Pu(1, 0, 1)+ (1−P )u(1, 1, 1). For any P ∈ (0, 1), as long as Qt is such that u(1, 0, Qt) ≥
u(1, 1, 1), the agent’s expected payoff from action 1 is higher. Hence, the action profile
with unanimous action constitutes mutual best responses.
Given an equilibrium φ∗, consider an arbitrary subset of the set of time periods with
infinite complete observations, which consists of sufficiently many consecutive commu-
nities of at least size Qˆ starting from some time period k. From the assumption that
G(Q ≥ Qˆ) > 0, such a subset exists with probability 1. Let Bk be the neighborhood
consisting of the first k communities, and consider any agent in a community of size Q
who has a private signal s and observes Bk. Let R
Bk
φ∗ be the random variable of the
posterior belief about the true state being 1 given each decision in Bk. For each realized
belief RBkφ∗ = r, we say that a realized private signal s and decision sequence h in Bk
induce r if Pφ∗(θ = 1|h, s) = r.
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Lemma 2. In any equilibrium φ∗, for either state θ = 0, 1 and for any s ∈ S, we have
lim
ǫ→0+
(lim sup
k→∞
Pφ∗(R
Bk
φ∗ > 1− ǫ|0, s))
= lim
ǫ→0+
(lim sup
k→∞
Pφ∗(R
Bk
φ∗ < ǫ|1, s)) = 0.
Proof. I prove here that limǫ→0+(lim supk→∞Pφ∗(R
Bk
φ∗ > 1− ǫ|0, s)) = 0, and the second
equality would follow from an analogous argument. Suppose that the equality does not
hold; then s ∈ S and ρ > 0 exist such that for any ǫ > 0 and any N ∈ N, k > N exists
such that Pφ∗(R
Bk
φ∗ > 1 − ǫ|0, s) > ρ. Consider any realized action sequence hǫ from Bk
that, together with s, induces some r > 1− ǫ, and let Hǫ denote the set of all such action
sequences; thus, we know that
Pφ∗(hǫ|θ′)f
Q
θ′ (s)
Pφ∗(hǫ|θ)f
Q
θ (s) + Pφ∗(hǫ|θ
′)fQθ′ (s)
= r
∑
hǫ∈Hǫ
Pφ∗(hǫ|θ) > ρ.
The above two conditions imply that
1 ≥
∑
hǫ∈Hǫ
Pφ∗(hǫ|θ
′) >
(1− ǫ)ρfQθ (s)
ǫf
Q
θ′ (s)
.
For sufficiently small ǫ, we have
(1−ǫ)ρfQ
θ
(s)
ǫfQ
θ′
(s)
> 1, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3. There exists an equilibrium φ∗ such that given any realized belief r ∈ (0, 1)
about state 1 for an agent observing Bk, for any rˆ ∈ (0, r) (rˆ ∈ (r, 1)), N(r, rˆ) ∈ N exists
such that a realized belief that is less than rˆ (higher than rˆ) can be induced by having
complete observations of additional N(r, rˆ) communities, each with unanimous action 0
(1).
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that rˆ ∈ (0, r). We know that there is a
private signal s and an action sequence h from Bk such that
r =
Pφ∗(h|1)f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(h|1)f
Q
1 (s) + Pφ∗(h|0)f
Q
0 (s)
.
Let ak+1 = 0 denote the event that action 0 is taken by every agent in the (k + 1)th
community. The new belief would then be
r1 =
Pφ∗(h|1)f
Q
1 (s)×Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|h, 1)
Pσ∗(1)(h|1)f
Q
1 (s)× Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|h, 1) + Pφ∗(h|0)f
Q
0 (s)×Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|h, 0)
.
I now explicitly describe an equilibrium φ∗ that will prove this result. Consider the
following strategy profile for agents in an arbitrary community N t:
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1. If Qt < Qˆ, each agent takes the action that matches the state with higher
probability according to signal and observation.
2. If Qt ≥ Qˆ:
– Fix some ǫ > 0. Let s1(ǫ), s0(ǫ) be such that F
Q
1 (s1(ǫ)) − F
Q
1 (s0(ǫ)) =
F
Q
0 (s1(ǫ)) − F
Q
0 (s0(ǫ)) = 1 − 2ǫ. Each agent takes action 1 if s
t ≥ s1(ǫ)
and action 0 if st ≤ s0(ǫ).
– Otherwise, each agent takes the action that matches the state with higher
probability according to observation only.
By Lemma 1, when Q is sufficiently large, both (1) and (2) constitute mutual best
responses given I t. Hence, the above strategy profile is an equilibrium. We then have
Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|h, 1) =FQ1 (s0(ǫ)) + (F
Q
1 (s1(ǫ))− F
Q
1 (s0(ǫ)))
Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|sk+1 ∈ (s0(ǫ), s1(ǫ)), h, 1)
Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|h, 0) =FQ0 (s0(ǫ)) + (F
Q
0 (s1(ǫ))− F
Q
0 (s0(ǫ)))
Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|sk+1 ∈ (s0(ǫ), s1(ǫ)), h, 0)
By construction of φ∗, FQ1 (s0(ǫ)) < F
Q
0 (s0(ǫ)). Based on the assumption of complete
observations, h consists of every action that agent k+1 may have observed, which implies
that Pφ∗(ak+1 = 0|sk+1 ∈ (s0(ǫ), s1(ǫ)), h, 1) = Pφ∗(ak+1 = 0|sk+1 ∈ (s0(ǫ), s1(ǫ)), h, 0).
Hence, we know that the ratio
Pφ∗ (a
k+1=0|h,1)
Pφ∗ (ak+1=0|h,0)
has a < 1 upper bound that is independent
of h. Let y denote this bound, and we have
r1
r
=
1 +
Pφ∗ (h|0)f
Q
0
(s)
Pφ∗ (h|1)f
Q
1
(s)
1 +
Pφ∗ (h|0)f
Q
0
(s)
Pφ∗ (h|1)f
Q
1
(s)
Pφ∗ (ak+1=0|h,1)
Pφ∗ (ak+1=0|h,0)
=
1
r + (1− r)
Pφ∗(ak+1=0|h,0)
Pφ∗(ak+1=0|h,1)
<
1
r + (1− r) 1
y
< 1.
Note that the expression on the right-hand side above is increasing in r. Let rm denote
the belief induced by h ∪ {ak+1, · · · , ak+m} where ak+1 = · · · = ak+m = 0. We have
rm = r ×
r1
r
× · · · ×
rm
rm−1
< r ×
1
r + (1− r) 1
y
× · · · ×
1
rm + (1− rm)
1
y
.
Because r, r1, · · · , rm are decreasing, we have rm < r × (
1
r+(1−r) 1
y
)m. Hence, we can
find the desired N(r, rˆ) for any rˆ ∈ (0, r) such that a realized belief that is less than rˆ
can be induced by s and h ∪ {ak+1, · · · , ak+N(r,rˆ)}, where ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(r,rˆ) = 0.
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Lemma 4. Consider the φ∗ constructed above. Let aˆ be the action that matches the state
with higher probability given s and every action in Bk, and let P
Bk
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) denote the
probability that aˆ does not match the state. We have limk→∞P
Bk
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) = 0.
Proof. Suppose the opposite: noting that PBkφ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) must be weakly decreasing in
k, it follows that limk→∞P
Bk
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) > 0. Let ρ > 0 denote this limit. From Lemma
2, we know that for any α > 0 and for either true state θ = 0, 1, z ∈ [1
2
, 1) exists such
that M ∈ N exists such that max{Pφ∗(R
Bk
φ∗ > z|0, s),Pφ∗(1− R
Bk
φ∗ > z|1, s)} < α for any
k > M . If α = 1
2
ρ, then we have max{Pφ∗(R
Bk
φ∗ > z|0, s),Pφ∗(1 − R
Bk
φ∗ > z|1, s)} <
1
2
ρ
for any k > M . Then, for any δ > 0, we can find a sufficiently large k such that for any
k′ ≥ k, (1) P
Bk′
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) ∈ (ρ, ρ + δ) and (2) max{Pφ∗(R
Bk′
φ∗ > z|0, s),Pφ∗(1 − R
Bk′
φ∗ >
z|1, s)} < 1
2
ρ. Hence, we have
f
Q
0 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(R
Bk′
φ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|0, s) +
f
Q
1 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(1−R
Bk′
φ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|1, s)
=P
Bk′
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)−
f
Q
0 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(R
Bk′
φ∗ > z|0, s)
−
f
Q
1 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f1(s)
Pφ∗(1−R
Bk′
φ∗ > z|1, s) >
1
2
ρ.
By Lemma 3, for any π > 0, N(π) = max{N(z, 1
2+π
), N(1 − z, 1 − 1
2+π
)} ∈ N exists
such that whenever θ = 0 and RBkφ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z] or θ = 1 and 1 − RBkφ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z], additional
N(π) observations can reverse an incorrect decision. Consider the following (sub-optimal)
updating method for a rational agent who observes Bk′ = Bk+N(π): her action changes
from 1 to 0 if and only if RBkφ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z], and ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0; her action changes
from 0 to 1 if and only if 1 − RBkφ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z], and ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1. Let h denote
a decision sequence from Bk that, together with s, induces such a posterior belief in the
former case, and let h′ denote a decision sequence from Bk that, together with s, induces
such a posterior belief in the latter case. Let H and H ′ respectively denote the sets of
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these decision sequences. We have
PBkφ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)−P
Bk′
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)
≥
∑
h∈H
(
f
Q
0 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)
−
f
Q
1 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1))
+
∑
h′∈H′
(
f
Q
1 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|1)
−
f
Q
0 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|0)).
From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that for every h,
Pφ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)f
Q
0 (s)
Pφ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)f
Q
0 (s) + Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1)fQ1 (s)
≥
1 + π
2 + π
,
which implies that
Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)fQ0 (s)− Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1)fQ1 (s)
≥πfQ1 (s)Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1).
From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that the quantities Pφ∗(a
k+1 = 0|h, 1) and Pφ∗(a
k+1 =
1|h, 0) have a > 0 lower bound that is independent of h. We denote this bound as w, and
the above inequality can be written as
Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)fQ0 (s)− Pφ∗(h, a
k+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1)fQ1 (s)
≥πfQ1 (s)w
N(π)Pφ∗(h|1).
Based on the definition of h, we have
1
2
≤
Pφ∗(h|1)f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(h|1)f
Q
1 (s) + Pφ∗(h|0)f
Q
0 (s)
≤ z,
which implies that
Pφ∗(h|1)f
Q
1 (s) ≥ Pφ∗(h|0)f
Q
0 (s).
Similarly, we have
Pφ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|1)fQ1 (s)− Pφ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|0)fQ0 (s)
≥πfQ0 (s)w
N(π)Pφ∗(h
′|0),
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and
Pφ∗(h
′|0)fQ0 (s) ≥ Pφ∗(h
′|1)fQ1 (s).
From the previous construction, we know that
f
Q
0 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
∑
h∈H
Pφ∗(h|0) +
f
Q
1 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
∑
h′∈H′
Pφ∗(h
′|1)
=
f
Q
0 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(R
Bk′
φ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|0, s) +
f
Q
1 (s)
f
Q
0 (s) + f
Q
1 (s)
Pφ∗(1−R
Bk′
φ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|1, s)
>
1
2
ρ.
Combining the previous inequalities, we have
PBkφ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)− P
Bk′
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)
>πwN(π)
1
2
ρ.
From the previous construction, we also know that
PBkφ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)− P
Bk′
φ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) < δ.
Clearly, for some given π > 0, a sufficiently small δ exists such that πwN(π) 1
2
ρ > δ, which
implies a contradiction.
Lemma 4 implies that in the equilibrium φ∗ constructed in Lemma 3, truth-telling
observation occurs. We can then compute the probability of taking the state-matching
action: limt→∞ Pφ∗(atn = θ) = 1−
1
2
F
Q
1 (s0(ǫ))−
1
2
(1−FQ0 (s1(ǫ)). From the characterization
of s0(ǫ) and s1(ǫ), we know that F
Q
1 (s0(ǫ))+1−F
Q
0 (s1(ǫ)) < F
Q
1 (s0(ǫ))+1−F
Q
1 (s1(ǫ)) =
2ǫ, which implies that limt→∞Pφ∗(a
t
n = θ) > 1− ǫ.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an infinite subset of communities {N t1 , N t2 , · · · }
such that N tn+1 ’s observation includes N tn . By the assumption of expanding obser-
vations, we know that each community belongs to at least one such subset. Then, it
suffices to show that asymptotic learning occurs in each of these subsets.
Consider the following equilibrium φ∗: for every I t, every agent in N t takes the action
that matches the state with higher probability according to both signal and observation.
Because actions are unanimous in equilibrium, I use at to denote the equilibrium action
in community N t. Suppose that the result does not hold, i.e., there exists {N t1 , N t2 , · · · }
such that limn→Pφ∗(atn = θ) = P < 1.
41
For an arbitrary ǫ > 0, find n such that Pφ∗(a
tn = θ) ∈ (P − ǫ, P ). It follows that
there must be some community size Q′ in support of G, such that either Pφ∗(atn = 1|θ =
1, Qtn = Q′) < P or Pφ∗(atn = 0|θ = 0, Qtn = Q′) < P . Without loss of generality, assume
that the second inequality holds. Based on the assumption of unbounded private beliefs,
there exists Q such that lims→1
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)+fQ
1
(s)
= 1 and lims→−1
fQ
1
(s)
fQ
0
(s)+fQ
1
(s)
= 0. Consider
community N tn+1 with the realized community size Q and a sufficiently small private
signal stn+1 . If the agents in N tn+1 take their action according to signals only, each
receives the expected payoff
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1)
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1) + fQ1 (s
tn+1)
u(1, 1, Q) +
f
Q
1 (s
tn+1)
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1) + fQ1 (s
tn+1)
u(1, 0, Q).
If they simply follow the action in community N tn , each receives the expected payoff
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1)
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1) + fQ1 (s
tn+1)
(Pφ∗(a
tn = 0|θ = 0, Qtn = Q′)u(1, 1, Q)
+ Pφ∗(a
tn = 1|θ = 0, Qtn = Q′)u(1, 0, Q))
+
f
Q
1 (s
tn+1)
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1) + fQ1 (s
tn+1)
(Pφ∗(a
tn = 1|θ = 1, Qtn = Q′)u(1, 1, Q)
+ Pφ∗(a
tn = 0|θ = 1, Qtn = Q′)u(1, 0, Q)).
The difference between the two payoffs is bounded below by
(
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1)
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1) + fQ1 (s
tn+1)
(1− P )−
f
Q
1 (s
tn+1)
f
Q
0 (s
tn+1) + fQ1 (s
tn+1)
)(u(1, 1, Q)− u(1, 0, Q)).
Because private beliefs are bounded, there exists s′ > −1 such that this difference is
positive when stn+1 ∈ (−1, s′). It follows that there exists ∆ > 0 such that Pφ∗(atn+1 =
θ|Qtn+1 = Q) > Pφ∗(atn = θ|Qtn = Q′) + ∆. Hence, we have Pφ∗(atn+1 = θ) > Pφ∗(atn =
θ) +∆G(Q′)G(Q) > P − ǫ+∆G(Q′)G(Q). Because ǫ can be taken arbitrarily, when ǫ is
sufficiently small, we have Pφ∗(atn+1 = θ) > P , which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider the following strategy profile σ for agents in an arbi-
trary community N t:
1. Given any st, agent 1 observes at−11 , and no other agent makes any observation.
2. If ht = {at−11 }, then each agent in N
t takes the action that matches the state
with higher probability according to I t. Otherwise, each agent takes the opposite
action (the action that matches the state with lower probability).
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By Lemma 1, the action profile given I t specified above constitutes mutual best re-
sponses when Qt is sufficiently large. If ht 6= {at−11 }, the payoff before cost for each agent
in N t is bounded above by 1
2
(u(1, 1, Qt) + u(1, 0, Qt)); if ht = {at−11 }, the payoff before
cost is bounded below by
1
2
((FQ
t
0 (sˆ) + (1− F
Qt
1 (sˆ)))u(1, 1, Q
t) + (FQ
t
1 (sˆ) + (1− F
Qt
0 (sˆ)))u(1, 0, Q
t)),
where sˆ is characterized by fQ
t
0 (sˆ) = f
Qt
1 (sˆ). When c is small, the difference between
the two payoffs exceeds c for sufficiently large Qt. Hence, it is optimal to follow the
observation decision in (1) above given that every other agent follows σ, which means
that σ is an equilibrium.
Note that in σ, starting from t = 2, agents in Qt always observe at−11 regardless of s
t.
Thus, we can apply Proposition 2 to obtain asymptotic learning in σ.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the following strategy profile σ for agents in an arbi-
trary community N t:
1. Given any st, agent 1 observes the neighborhood Bt of size K(t) that maximizes
Pσ(aˆ
t = θ|Bt), and no other agent makes any observation.
2. If ht = {am : m ∈ Bt}: Fix some ǫ > 0. Let s1(ǫ), s0(ǫ) be such that F
Qt
1 (s1(ǫ))−
F
Qt
1 (s0(ǫ)) = F
Qt
0 (s1(ǫ))−F
Qt
0 (s0(ǫ)) = 1−2ǫ. An agent takes action 1 if s
t ≥ s1(ǫ)
and action 0 if st ≤ s0(ǫ). Otherwise, an agent takes the action that matches the
state with higher probability according to observation only.
3. If ht 6= {am : m ∈ B
t}, each agent takes the action that matches the state with
lower probability according to I t.
From the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, σ is an equilibrium. We can then apply
Theorem 1 to prove the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider any community N t of size Q, N
′t ⊂ N t of size Q′
and any I t. Let at(I t) be the truth-seeking action profile and a
′t(I t) be an arbitrary
action profile with unanimous action. Without loss of generality, assume that atn(I
t) = 1
and a
′t
n(I
t) = 0. Let P denote the probability that θ = 1 given I t. The definition of the
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truth-seeking action profile implies that P ≥ 1
2
. Then, we have
vtn(a
t(I t), I t)− vtn(({a
′t
i (I
t)}i∈N ′t , {a
t
j(I
t)}i/∈N ′t), I
t)
=Pu(1, 1, Q) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q)− (Pu(1, 0, Q′) + (1− P )u(1, 1, Q′))
vtn(a
′t(I t), I t)− vtn(({a
t
i(I
t)}i∈N ′t , {a
′t
j (I
t)}i/∈N ′t), I
t)
=Pu(1, 0, Q) + (1− P )u(1, 1, Q)− (Pu(1, 1, Q′) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q′)).
It follows that
vtn(a
t(I t), I t)− vtn(({a
′t
i (I
t)}i∈N ′t , {a
t
j(I
t)}i/∈N ′t), I
t)
− (vtn(a
′t(I t), I t)− vtn(({a
t
i(I
t)}i∈N ′t , {a
′t
j (I
t)}i/∈N ′t), I
t))
=(2P − 1)(u(1, 1, Q)− u(1, 0, Q′)) + (1− 2P )(u(1, 0, Q)− u(1, 1, Q′))
=(2P − 1)(u(1, 1, Q)− u(1, 0, Q′)− (u(1, 0, Q)− u(1, 1, Q′)))
=(2P − 1)(u(1, 1, Q)− u(1, 0, Q) + u(1, 1, Q′)− u(1, 0, Q′)) ≥ 0.
Hence, the inequality is proven.
Proof of Proposition 4. From Theorem 2, we know that truth-telling observation oc-
curs in every σ∗T . Suppose that Q
t = Q. From the characterization of s∗(Q), we know
that for any st ∈ (−s∗(Q), s∗(Q)), agents in N t prefer paying c to know the true state
over paying nothing and acting according to st. It then follows that when t is sufficiently
large, whenever st ∈ (−s∗, s∗), the equilibrium observation in σ∗T is non-empty; other-
wise, given the truth-seeking action profile, any agent can be better off by paying c and
observing a neighborhood of size K(t). Therefore, at the limit, an agent takes the correct
action if and only if her signal lies in [−s∗(Q), s∗(Q)] and follows her signal otherwise.
The probability of her action matching the state, Pσ∗
T
(atn = θ|Q
t = Q), is then equal to
F0(s
∗(Q)). Finally, by taking expectation over the probability distribution G, we obtain
Pσ∗
T
(atn = θ) = EG[F0(s
∗(Q))].
Proof of Corollary 1. Note that F0(s
∗(Q)) is increasing in Q. The result follows by
applying the relevant property of first-order stochastic dominance.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that there exists a symmetric equilibrium φ∗ with
asymptotic learning. Since agents in the same community are using identical strategies
by assumption, I use st to denote the private signal of an arbitrary agent in N t.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the true state is 1. Fix an arbitrary positive
number ǫ1. Since asymptotic learning occurs, we can find tˆ such that: if the true state
is 0, for every t ≥ tˆ and every agent in N t, the agent takes action 0 with a probability
of at least 1− ǫ1. Hence the probability that every agent in N tˆ takes action 0 is at least
(1 − ǫ1)
Qtˆ. By asymptotic learning and continuity of the signal distributions, for every
positive number ǫ2 we can find a sufficiently small ǫ1 and the corresponding tˆ such that
an arbitrary agent in N tˆ+1 takes action 0 with a probability of at least 1− ǫ2 under either
state, given that each agent in N tˆ has taken action 0. Note that since tˆ is finite, the
probability that each agent in N tˆ takes action 0 under the true state 1 is still positive
and bounded away from 0.
Now consider the optimal action of an agent in N tˆ+1. Signals are independent, so with
probability of at least (1 − ǫ2)
Qtˆ+1−1 all the other agents in N tˆ+1 will choose action 0. If
the agent chooses action 0, her payoff is bounded below by (1 − ǫ2)Q
tˆ+1−1u(1, 0, Qtˆ+1);
if she chooses action 1, her payoff is bounded above by max{(1 − ǫ2)Q
tˆ+1−1u(1, 1, 1) +
(1− (1− ǫ2)Q
tˆ+1−1)u(1, 0, Qtˆ+1), (1− ǫ2)Q
tˆ+1−1u(1, 0, 1)+(1− (1− ǫ2)Q
tˆ+1−1)u(1, 1, Qtˆ+1)}.
When Qtˆ+1 is sufficiently large, we can find sufficiently small ǫ2 such that the first bound
is higher than the second bound. Hence, the agent will choose action 0 regardless of her
private signal. This argument then works for every t′ ≥ tˆ+ 1, which means that herding
occurs. This is a contradiction to asymptotic learning.
Proof of Proposition 6. In any equilibrium, the number of agents choosing action 1,
denoted Qt1, must satisfy
Pu(1, 1, Qt1) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q
t
1) ≥ (1− P )u(1, 1, Q
t −Qt1 + 1) + Pu(1, 0, Q
t −Qt1 + 1)
(1− P )u(1, 1, Qt −Qt1) + Pu(1, 0, Q
t −Qt1) ≥ Pu(1, 1, Q
t
1 + 1) + (1− P )u(1, 0, Q
t
1 + 1).
From the second inequality, we have
u(1, 1, Qt −Qt1)− u(1, 0, Q
t
1 + 1) ≥
P
1− P
(u(1, 1, Qt1 + 1)− u(1, 0, Q
t −Qt1))
From the assumption that P > 1, we know that either (1) u(1, 1, Qt−Qt1)−u(1, 0, Q
t
1+1)
is positive and u(1, 1, Qt−Qt1)− u(1, 0, Q
t
1+1) ≥ u(1, 1, Q
t
1+1)− u(1, 0, Q
t−Qt1) or (2)
both u(1, 1, Qt−Qt1)−u(1, 0, Q
t
1+1) and u(1, 1, Q
t
1+1)−u(1, 0, Q
t−Qt1) are non-positive.
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Assume that (1) holds. Note that u(1, 1, Qt − Qt1) − u(1, 1, Q
t
1 + 1) and u(1, 1, Q
t −
Qt1)− u(1, 1, Q
t
1 + 1) have the same sign. Then, from u(1, 1, Q
t−Qt1)− u(1, 0, Q
t
1 + 1) ≥
u(1, 1, Qt1+1)−u(1, 0, Q
t−Qt1), we have Q
t−Qt1 ≤ Q
t
1+1, which implies that Q
t
1 ≥
1
2
Qt.
Assume that (2) holds. Then, from the two non-positive expressions, it follows that
Qt−Qt1 > Q
t
1+1 and Q
t
1+1 > Q
t−Qt1, which is a contradiction. Hence, we can conclude
that the only possible case is (1), and thus, Qt1 ≥
1
2
Qt.
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